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I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Scope

The Royal Government of Cambodia established the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) to place the senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea on trial for
the atrocities that occurred in their country from 1975 until 1979.1 The ECCC will prosecute the
leaders for serious violations of Cambodian and international humanitarian law, customs, and
conventions.2 Such violations include, but are not limited to, acts of murder, rape, imprisonment,
torture, genocide, and religious persecution.3 However, the senior leaders may not escape
liability just by proving that someone else committed these crimes.4 The senior leaders of the
Khmer Rouge may be criminally liable under the doctrine of superior responsibility.5 This
memorandum will examine the existence of superior responsibility in international customary
law, its character in 1975, and special problems concerning its application.

1

ECCC Statute, art. 1 [ reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

2

Id. art. 2.

3

See id. art. 3–8.

4

Id. art. 29.

“Superior responsibility” and “command responsibility” are interchangeable, but the latter frequently connotes
military commanders. To avoid misconception, this memorandum will use “superior responsibility.” It is also
worth noting here that superior responsibility is most often considered a crime of omission, such that the superior
did not cause a crime but failed to prevent or repress it. A handful of analysts expand the doctrine of superior
responsibility to include situations where a superior has issued an order causing his subordinates to commit a crime,
calling the former situation “indirect superior responsibility” and the latter “direct superior responsibility.” This
latter category explicitly codified in all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See e.g. Geneva Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in a Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 2]. Cambodia signed onto the Geneva Conventions in 1958. Because the ECCC’s
concern is over ex post facto application of law, and “direct superior responsibility” was clearly binding
international conventional law, “direct superior responsibility” will not be addressed. Hereafter, “superior
responsibility” refers only to the crime of omission.
5
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B.

Summary of Conclusions
i.

Superior responsibility existed in the international customary law of
1975.

Using international conventions, domestic codifications, expert sponsorship and judicial
decisions as evidence, it is clear that superior responsibility existed in international customary
law by 1975. The drafting of Additional Protocol I and the cases following World War II
showed that an international consensus emerged that a superior could be held criminally liable
for the crimes of another if: (1) he had effective control over the perpetrator; (2) he knew or
possessed information of the offense; and (3) he failed to take necessary measures within his
material ability to prevent the crime or punish the perpetrator.
ii.

Both military and civilian leaders can be liable under superior
responsibility.

The “superior” in superior responsibility is not limited to military commanders. The
Tokyo Tribunal’s prosecution of various political leaders and the Nuremberg Tribunal’s
prosecution of industrial leaders shows that superior responsibility applies to military and
civilians alike.
iii.

The defendant must first have effective control over the perpetrator of
the underlying crime.

Inherent in the idea of superior responsibility is that a superior-subordinate relationship
existed between the defendant and those who committed the crimes. The relationship is not
based on the defendant’s formal position over the perpetrator, but rather his effective control
over the perpetrator.
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iv.

The defendant’s knowledge of his subordinate’s crime may be
determined by direct or circumstantial evidence.

A superior may be liable if he “knew or had reason to know” of his subordinate’s crimes.
Besides direct evidence, the case of General Yamashita shows that actual knowledge of the
crimes can be based on circumstantial evidence. The number, scope, severity and methods of the
crimes are all factors that may support a finding of knowledge.
v.

If actual knowledge is absent, the prosecution must show that the
defendant had information in his possession which provided him with
a “reason to know” of the crimes.

The alternative mens rea standard of “should have known” emerged from the World War
II cases and the drafting of the Additional Protocol I. This standard is not significantly different
from “had reason to know” of the ECCC Statute, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) proved. If the superior had, in his possession, information which
enabled him to know that that a crime would be or had been committed he may be criminally
liable.
vi.

The defendant’s criminal failure to act must be determined on a caseby-case basis in light of the defendant’s material ability to act.

Again using the lens of the ICTY to view World War II cases, it becomes evident that the
third element of superior responsibility is fact-specific and inextricably linked to the defendant’s
awareness and material ability. His awareness triggers his duty to act, and his material ability
determines whether he actually failed in his duty.

9

vii.

International customary law appears to limit superior responsibility
to international armed conflicts.

The international customary law of superior responsibility is saturated with the influence
of World War II. Because of this, superior responsibility was apparently limited to international
armed conflicts in 1975 and may be inapplicable to many of the crimes that occurred under the
Khmer Rouge.
viii.

Prosecutions for genocide under superior responsibility require a
heightened mens rea standard to be viable.

The crime of genocide requires that the specific intent to destroy a group of people,
which is logically incompatible with the almost negligent standard of “knew or had reason to
know.” The logical paradox is potentially overcome if superior responsibility’s mens rea
standard is reinterpreted to approach a willful blindness, but support remains lacking.
II. SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW
A.

Sources of international customary law

In the decades between the World War II conviction and the rise of the Khmer Rouge in
1975, the sporadic appearance of superior responsibility convictions caused scholars to question
whether superior responsibility had any place within international law.6 Given that the ECCC
intends to apply superior responsibility against the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge,7 the

6

Richard L. Lael, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY ix (1982)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
ECCC Statute, supra art. 1 (“The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea
and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international
humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during
the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.”). ECCC Statute, supra art. 29 (“The fact that any of the acts
referred to in Articles 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law were committed by a subordinate does not relieve the
superior of personal criminal responsibility if the superior had effective command and control or authority and
control over the subordinate, and the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit
7
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scholars’ question must be resolved in the affirmative for the ECCC to proceed. ECCC should
not feel threatened by the relatively few judicial applications of superior responsibility, for
international customary law may arise with or without judicial proceedings.8 The generally
accepted criteria for determining international law are recorded in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). 9 Article 38 holds that international law is found in
international conventions, international custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions and
teachings of highly qualified publicists across the world.10 By following the evolution of
superior responsibility among these sources, it becomes clear that superior responsibility not
only existed as customary international law by 1975, but individuals could be criminally liable
under the doctrine.
B.

Foundations in international conventions
i.

1907 Hague Conventions

The analysis of superior responsibility in international customary law begins with a look
at its foundations in international conventions, starting with the 1907 Hague Peace Conference.11
Although the Hague Conventions left the question of a leader’s criminal liability unresolved,

such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts
or to punish the perpetrators.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
See William V. O’Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam 60 Geo. L. J. 605, 611 (1971)
(although the discussion is also limited to the laws of war, the analysis applies equally to the law of nations)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
8

9

Francisco Forrest Martin, Stephen J. Schnably, Richard J. Wilson, Jonathan S. Simon & Mark V. Tushnet,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES, CASES & ANALYSIS 22 (2006) (Article 38 of the
ICJ enumerates the “universally recognized” sources of law) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
10

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1005 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 6].
11

See Ilias Bantekas, PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT AND SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 69 (2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
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they certainly implied that leaders “shall be answerable” for belligerents.12 Arguably, Article 1’s
responsible command requirement, in conjunction Article 43’s obligation to guarantee public
order and safety, codified the international custom regarding the duties and responsibilities of
commanders.13 The Hague Convention’s assignment of general responsibilities to leaders led
inevitably the enforcement of criminal liability against those leaders.14
ii.

1919 Paris Commission

At the conclusion of World War I, a “Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors
of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties” (hereafter “Paris Commission”) gathered at the
Palace of Versailles. Seeking to individually punish Kaiser Wilhelm II and other German
officers for the atrocities that occurred in the war, the majority Report concluded that criminal
charges could be brought
[a]gainst all authorities, civil or military, belonging to enemy countries,
however high their position may have been without distinction of rank,
including the heads of States, who ordered, or, with knowledge thereof
and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking
measures to prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws
or customs of war.15
The countries which supported this conclusion included Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium,
Greece, Poland, Romania, and Serbia. Only two countries held back, the United States and
Japan.

12

Shane Darcy, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (2007)
(quoting J.M. Spaight, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND (1911)) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
13

See William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1973) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
14

See id. at 2.

15

Violation of the Laws, supra at 24 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
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The United States and Japanese delegations held reservations about the majority’s
conclusions, specifically the doctrine of superior responsibility.16 The Japanese delegates
hesitated to support criminal liability under superior responsibility because they feared it would
not satisfy public opinion.17 Even so, Japanese delegates were convinced that principle
responsibility for the international crimes of World War I rested upon German leadership.18
The American delegates raised two concerns, both of which sidestepped direct opposition
of the doctrine. First, they were concerned with the uncertainty of the “laws of humanity.”19 As
a practical matter, the American delegates did not know how tribunals would determine the
appropriate source of international law. Apparently, their fear was that zealous tribunals would
improperly tailor law on an ad hoc basis from immediate political pressures or isolated
precedent. Time has addressed this concern, however, with the authoritative Article 38 of the
1945 ICJ statute.20 International tribunals have known since then which sources to draw upon so
that individual defendants are not arbitrarily prosecuted.
The Americans’ second concern was that Heads of State “are not and…should not be
made responsible to any other sovereignty.”21 Even though the Americans did not deny the
responsibility of Heads of State, the Americans contended that the affirmative defense of

16

.Darcy, supra at 297 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25]. The American delegates referred to
superior responsibility as “the doctrine of negative criminality.” Despite his dissenting opinion, one of the two
Americans, James Brown Scott, declared that the procedures of both the majority and dissenting Reports should be
followed. Violation of the Laws, supra at vi [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
17

Violation of the Laws, supra at 80 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].

18

Id. at 80.

19

Id. at 73.

20

See Sheldon Glueck, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSECUTION & PUNISHMENT 122 (1944) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
21

Violation of the Laws, supra at 76 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
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sovereign immunity would defeat any possible finding of criminal liability.22 This argument was
one of practicality, not of principle. Shortly after making the argument, the Americans flatly
stated that this second concern did not apply at all to Heads of State who abdicated or were
repudiated by their people.23 This signaled that they were not opposed to superior responsibility
in its entirety, just insofar as it interacted with the sovereign immunity of acceptable leaders.
Even so, the argument was likely misplaced. The only support the Americans provided for their
argument was a single, inapplicable case involving the peacetime property rights between
friendly sovereigns. 24
The theory of superior responsibility proposed by the Paris Commission on March 29,
1919 failed to appear three months later in the Treaty of Versailles. Instead, Articles 227 and
228 simply provided for the arraignment of Kaiser Wilhelm II and other officers for violations of
international law.25 While doctrine of superior responsibility can still be inferred from the two
articles,26 the Treaty of Versailles only explicitly supplied the conventional precedent that
leaders could be individually prosecuted under international law. The reason the precedent did
not gain more international appreciation is because the Netherlands refused to surrender the
Kaiser to trial and the political will to pursue justice thereafter quickly dissolved. 27

22

Id. at 76.

23

Id. at 66.

24

The case cited is Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. Professor Glueck also further contends that the case was
already out of date by 1919, and that “there is nothing immutable about the ideas of sovereignty…[it] is based on
international comity and courtesy.” Glueck, supra at 122 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
25

See Violation of the Laws, supra at vii [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].

26

Bantekas, supra at 69 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].

27

Glueck, supra at 126 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
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iii.

Additional Protocols of 1977

Explicit international codification of superior responsibility did not appear until 1977,
when the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was adopted. Limited to
international armed conflicts, Article 86 provided that:
The fact the breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed
by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which
would have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time,
that he was committing or was about to commit such a breach and if they
did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress
such a breach.28
Military commanders are specifically addressed in Article 87, which provides that commanders
have obligations to prevent, suppress, and report crimes, an obligation to ensure compliance with
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Protocols, and an obligation to initiate disciplinary or
penal actions against violators.29
While Additional Protocol I was not binding on countries in 1975, the principle adopted
reflects the international customary law of several years beforehand. When the International
Committee of the Red Cross gathered experts and governments together to decide on a rule of
omission, the draft proposed in 1973 read:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of the present Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal
responsibility if they knew or should have known that he was committing
or would commit such a breach and if they did not take measures within
their power to prevent or repress such a breach.30

28

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 86, adopted June 8, 1977 [hereinafter “Protocol I,” reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
29

Id. art. 87.

30

Darcy, supra at 330 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
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One can tell at a glance that it is not significantly different from the final Article 86.
The original mens rea element of “knew or should have known” caused some
confusion among the international delegates, and was tweaked.31 The word
“feasible” was added between “take measures.” Still, the principle of superior
responsibility as a whole remained unchanged. This certainly indicates that superior
responsibility existed in international customary law by 1975. Other sources support
this contention as well, as will be shown.
C.

Domestic codifications
i.

Before nineteenth century

Domestic laws and other legal instruments throughout the world recognized superior
responsibility for centuries. In 1439, King Charles VII of France ordained criminal
responsibility for any officer who failed to prevent or punish the criminal acts of his subordinates
“as if he had committed [the crime] himself.”32 In 1621, King Adolphus of Sweden also
recognized superior responsibility in his “Articles of Military Lawwes to be observed in the
Warres.”33
The domestic codifications spread to the New World as well. In 1775, the Provisional
Congress of Massachusetts Bay adopted the Articles of War, which held that:
Every Officer commanding, in quarters, or on a march, shall keep good
order, and to the utmost of his power, redress all such abuses or disorders
which may be committed by any Officer or Soldier under his command; if
upon complaint made to him of Officers or Soldiers beating or otherwise
ill-treating any person, or committing any kind of riots to the disquieting
of the inhabitants of this Continent, he, the said commander, who shall
31

Id. at 331–33.

32

Bantekas, supra at 68 (citing L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 319, 321 (1995)) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
33

See Parks, supra at 5 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
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refuse to omit to see Justice done to this offender or offenders, and
reparation made to the party or parties injured, as soon as the offender’s
wages shall enable him or them, upon due proof thereof, be punished as
ordered by General Court-Martial, in such manner as if he himself had
committed the crimes or disorders complained of.34
Establishment of superior responsibility was reiterated throughout multiple promulgations of the
American Articles of War.35
ii.

Mid-nineteenth century

Shortly after the start of World War II, nations across the globe promulgated rules which
reaffirmed the doctrine of superior responsibility and its application to individuals.36 On August
28, 1944, France passed an ordinance which applied criminal liability for superiors who
organized or tolerated criminal acts of their subordinates.37 This ordinance applied to all of
France’s territories and colonies, including Cambodia.38 Article IX of the October 24, 1946
Chinese Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals provided that:
Persons who occupy a supervisory or commanding position in relation to
war criminals and in this capacity have not fulfilled their duty to prevent
crimes from being committed by their subordinates shall be treated as
accomplices of the war criminals.39
34

Id. at 5, 11 (citing Articles of War, Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay, April 5, 1775) (emphasis
omitted).
35

See id. at 5, 11 (referencing the Articles of War (June 30, 1775), Article XII; Articles of War (September 20,
1776), Section IX; and Articles of War (1916), Article 54). See also Bantekas, supra note 8 at 68 (citing Article 33
of the 1806 Articles of War) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
36

LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS Vol. XIV 158 (UN War Crimes Commission: London, 1949) Vol.
XIV [hereinafter “LRTWC Vol. XIV,” reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
37

Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment (Nov. 16, 1998) ¶ 336 (quoting the text of the
French ordinance; “Where a subordinate is prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of a war crime, and his superiors
cannot be indicted as being equally responsible, [his superiors] shall be considered as accomplices in so far as they
have organized or tolerated the criminal acts of their subordinates.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
15].
38

Henry Kamm, CAMBODIA: REPORT FROM A STRICKEN LAND xiv–xv (1998) (France maintained Cambodia as a
colony from 1864 until 1953) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
39

LRTWC Vol. XIV, supra at 158 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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Likewise, Netherlands East Indies Statute Book Decree No. 45 of 1946 included a
provision punishing superiors who tolerated a subordinate’s war crime “whilst
knowing, or at least must have reasonably supposed, that it was being or would be
committed.”40
The 1956 United States Army Field Manual provides possibly the most detailed domestic
codification of the modern doctrine of superior responsibility. Field Manual paragraph 501
states that a military commander is responsible for everyone under his control.41 The
commander may be held criminally liable for his subordinates’ atrocities against the civilian
population and prisoners of war. First, the commander is directly for the execution of any order
the commander passed to his subordinates. Second, he is indirectly liable if
he has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports
received by him or other means, [that his subordinates] are about to
commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary
and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to punish
violators thereof.42
This paragraph appears in the Field Manual under Section II, appropriately titled
“Crimes Under International Law.”

Thus, superior responsibility was well

established as a general principle of law and international custom by 1956.
D.

Expert sponsorship

Experts throughout history developed and advocated superior responsibility. Compiled
in the 1078 A.D., the Seven Military Classics of China provide the earliest recorded foundations.
The Seven Military Classics were written by famous Chinese generals over the course of several
40

LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS Vol. XI 100 (UN War Crimes Commission: London, 1949)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
U.S. Department of Army, Field Manual No. 27-10, Law of Land Warfare (1956) [hereinafter “U.S. Army
Manual No. 27-10,” reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
41

42

Id.
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millennia. The compilation is most well known for Sun Tzu’s Art of War, but Sun Tzu was not
the only one to write on the responsibilities and liabilities of leadership.
In the eleventh century B.C., General T’ai Kung wrote the Six Secret Teachings. While
teaching King Wen about the Tao of legendary sage emperors, Tai Kung warned that “if you
know something is wrong but you sanction it—it is in [this] that the Tao stops.”43 T’ai Kung
also stated that the Tao of a King is “like that of a Dragon’s Head…if he should get angry but
does not, evil subordinates will arise. If he should execute but does not, great thieves will
appear.”44 He also believed that punishment should extend all the way to the highest
leadership.45
In the fifth century B.C., General Sun Tzu famously demonstrated the responsibility of a
superior for his or her subordinates. He believed that: “When troops flee, are insubordinate,
distressed, collapse in disorder, or are routed, it is the fault of the general. None of these
disorders can be attributed to natural causes.”46 When a king asked for a demonstration, Sun Tzu
organized the king’s three hundred concubines into two companies, each led by the king’s
favorite concubines.47 After teaching the companies how to execute military drills, he issued an
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THE SEVEN MILITARY CLASSICS OF ANCIENT CHINA 45 (Ralph Sawyer transl., Basic Books 2007) (1993)
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order to assemble, advance and deploy.48 The women laughed, even after Sun Tzu explained and
repeated the order.49 At this Sun Tzu said: “If the words of command are not clear and distinct,
if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders are clear, and
the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.”50 Over the king’s protests,
Sun Tzu had the two concubine leaders beheaded.51
Around the fourth century B.C., Wei Liao-Tzu explicitly added criminal liability to earlier
concepts of superior responsibility.52 In his words:
All the officers—from the level of the double squad of ten up to the
generals of the right and left, superiors and inferiors--are mutually
responsible for each other. If someone violates an order or commits an
offense, those that report it will be spared from punishment, while those
who know about it but do not report it will all share the same offense.53
Wei Liao-Tzu believed that, regardless of one’s position or wartime conditions, a failure to
discover and report another’s crime or to prevent another’s death may punished as though one
had committed the crime himself.54
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Nearly two millennia later, Dutchman Hugo Grotius recorded the principle of superior
responsibility—including its criminal aspect.55 Like Wei Liao-tzu, Grotius believed liability
could attach to anyone regardless of position. He wrote that:
[T]hose who order a wicked act, or grant to it the necessary consent, or
who aid it, or who furnish asylum, or those who in any other way share in
the crime itself; those who give advice, who praise or approve; those who
do not forbid such an act although bound by law properly so called to
forbid it, or who do not bring aid to the injured although bound to do so by
the same law; those who do not dissuade when they out to dissuade; those
who conceal the fact which they are bound by some law to make known—
all these may be punished, if there is in them evil intent sufficient to
deserve punishment.56
He also established the criminality of superior responsibility by declaring that “a community, or
its rulers, may be held responsible for the crime of a subject if they knew of it and do not prevent
it when they could and should prevent it.”57 The lasting and widespread influence of Grotius’s
writing earned him the title of “the father of international law.” 58
Prominent American speakers advocated for superior responsibility as well. In 1861,
Union General George B. McClellan warned his officers that they would “be held responsible for
punishing aggression by those under their command.” 59 In 1944, Harvard criminal law professor
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Sheldon Glueck strongly argued for the punishment of the senior Axis leaders, for instituting,
approving, rewarding, and failing to prevent violations of criminal laws by their subordinates.60
The vocal support for superior responsibility increased over time. The International
Committee of the Red Cross noted, in 1973, that numerous experts had expressed eagerness to
codify superior responsibility into international law. 61 That year, while working on what would
later become Article 86 of Protocol I, the ICRC based their draft on the “proposals submitted by
experts, particularly by experts in criminal law [and government].”62 From the earliest
recordings of military philosophy to just before the rise of the Khmer Rouge, highly qualified
people have voiced their advocacy for the doctrine of superior responsibility.
E.

Judicial applications
i.

Before World War II

Judicial applications of superior responsibility stretch back to 1474. At that time, a
tribunal, composed of twenty-eight judges from the allied states of the Holy Roman Empire,
convicted Peter von Hagenbach for failing to prevent his subordinates from committing various
crimes including those against “the laws of God and man.”63 Von Hagenbach was stripped of
knighthood and executed for his crimes.64 Attempts to use superior responsibility under

Glueck, supra at 123 (Glueck passionately states that, “To say that [a leader like Hitler] is exempt from
punishment while the common soldier puppet who obeyed his orders must be punished it to fly in the face of reason,
justice and elementary decency; and no interpretation of law that arrived at such a conclusion could or ought to
withstand the wrath and the sense of fair play of the civilized peoples of the world.”) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 26].
60

61

Commentary to the Additional Protocol ¶ 3526 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman eds.,
Martinus Nijoff Publishers 1987) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
62

Id at ¶ 3526.
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international law were made ever since, but have not always been successful or clear. The
Leipzig Court, operating under international law just after World War I, convicted Captain Emil
Müller to six months for participating in the mistreatment of prisoners of war, including one
instance of tolerating mistreatment conducted by subordinates.65 Kaiser Wilhelm narrowly
evaded trial for failing to prevent or punish war crimes only because the Netherlands refused to
extradite him.66 Still, judicial applications of superior responsibility remained sporadic until
World War II.
ii. After World War II
As World War II drew to a close, the modern doctrine of superior responsibility had its
troublesome birth in the case of General Yamashita.67 The general charge laid against him by
the U.S. Military Commission was:
[that] between 9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, at Manila and at
other places in the Philippine Islands, while commander of armed forces
of Japan at war with the United States of America and its allies, [General
Tomoyuki Yamashita] unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his
duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high
crimes against people of the United States and of its allies and
dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he, General Tomoyuki
Yamashita, thereby violated the law of war.68
While Japanese forces under his authority had raped, mistreated, and murdered over 32,000
Filipino citizens and captured Americans, no direct link could be established between Yamashita
65

Cpt. Müller escaped a second similar charge under a theory of superior responsibility because the prosecution
failed to show that he knowingly permitted the mistreatment. Darcy, supra at 298–99 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 25].
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L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5 Transnational Law & Contemporary
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Army Forces, Western Pacific: Yamashita, Tomoyuki”, AG 000.5 JA, 31) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
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68
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and the atrocities.69 The case hinged on the prosecution’s assertions that Yamashita “should
have known” or “must have known” of the widespread atrocities. 70 Defense counsel countered
that Yamashita’s besieged battle conditions made knowledge impossible.71 Without addressing
the mens rea arguments in their opinion, the commission of lay judges found him guilty for
failing to provide effective control of his troops as required by the circumstances, and sentenced
him to death.72 The judgment was upheld in the U.S. Supreme Court, six to two.73
Although allegations of strict liability hounded the Yamashita decision for years,74 the
International Military Tribunal of the Far East applied superior responsibility too. The “Tokyo
Tribunal” charged twenty-six Japanese leaders under Count 54 with having ordered, authorized,
or permitted the commission of war crimes75 and under Count 55 for “recklessly disregarding
their legal duty by virtue of their offices to take adequate steps to secure the observance and
prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war.”76 The tribunal further clarified that leaders
could be criminally liable if:
(1) They had knowledge that crimes were being committed, and having
such knowledge they failed to take steps as were within their power to
prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, or
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(2) They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge.77
Of the eleven international judges,78 only two dissented from the convictions on political
grounds.79
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg also grappled with superior
responsibility. Two of the major cases the Nuremberg tribunal decided were United States v.
Wilhelm von Leeb et al. and United States v. Wilhelm List, better known as the High Command
and Hostages cases, respectively.80 In the High Command case, thirteen high ranking German
officers transmitted illegal orders through the chain of command,81 which caused their
subordinates to commit various war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.82
The High Command judges convicted those officers who knew of, but failed to oppose, the
illegal orders on the basis that their “personal neglect amount[ed] to a wanton, immoral disregard
of the action of [their] subordinates amounting to acquiescence.” 83
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In the Hostages case, defendant General von List, commander of occupied territory,
received reports of atrocities committed in the area. He denied having authority over the
perpetrators and denied having knowledge of the reports. In their judgment, the tribunal went
through the three criteria of superior responsibility. First, it found that List’s responsibility as a
commander of occupied territory extended to “all lawless groups or persons” within the area.
Then the court rejected the von List’s claims of ignorance, arguing that he should have known of
the crimes from the reports sent to them. The court found that von List had done nothing to
prevent or punish the offenses, and then found him guilty.
These trials following World War II brought about a great expansion of the principle that
individuals may be held criminally liable under international law.84 What distinguished these
trials from prior trials is that the defendants were almost entirely at or near the top of the military
or civilian hierarchy.85 The judgments also met with international approval. During its first
session in 1946, the United Nations “affirm[ed] the principles of international law recognized by
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.”86 By 1970, the results
of the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals had become the modern corpus of international criminal
law.87 Thus, superior responsibility clearly existed in international customary law well before
the rise of the Khmer Rouge.
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III.

CHARACTER OF SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
A.

Basis of analysis

Now that the ECCC may safely reaffirm that the doctrine of superior responsibility
existed in 1975, the tribunal must examine the character of the doctrine of the time. The
following analysis will concern itself off Article 29’s three essential elements: (1) a superiorsubordinate relationship, (2) a mens rea of “knew or had reason to know,” and (3) a failure to
prevent or punish. As will be discussed, superior responsibility was not well-defined in 1975,
especially with regard to the mens rea element. The cases before this time can support divergent
views of superior responsibility; so for the sake of future judicial integrity, the following
retrospective must necessarily be viewed through the lens of the ICTY analysis of the period.
B.

Superior-subordinate relationship
i.

Scope of “superior”

Inherent in the concept of superior responsibility is that the accused actually be a
“superior.” Before determining the substance of this first element of superior responsibility, the
scope of “superior” must be addressed. The doctrine of superior responsibility appears most
often in the context of military commanders. However, civilian or political superiors are also
subject to the doctrine. This principle has met approval since the Paris Commission first
recommended, in 1919, that “all authorities, civil or military,” could be charged with the crimes
of their subordinates.88
The Tokyo Tribunal relied upon the principle in making its findings of guilt against
civilian political leaders charged with having disregarded their duty take adequate steps to secure
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the observance of the laws and customs of war and to prevent their breach.89 It found Japanese
Foreign Minister Koki Hirota liable for the “Rape of Nanking” because:
[a]s Foreign Minister he received reports of these atrocities immediately
after the entry of the Japanese forces into Nanking. According to the
Defense evidence credence was given to these reports and the matter was
taken up with the War Ministry. Assurances were accepted from the War
Ministry that atrocities would be stopped. After these assurances had been
given reports of atrocities continued to come in for at least a month. The
Tribunal is of the opinion that HIROTA was derelict in his duty in not
insisting before the Cabinet that immediate action be taken to put an end
to the atrocities, failing any other action open to him to bring about the
same result. He was content to rely on assurances which he knew were
not being implemented while hundreds of murders, violations of women,
and other atrocities were being committed daily. His inaction amounted to
criminal negligence.90
The Tokyo Tribunal found several other government officials criminally liable for their failures
to secure observance of the law or to prevent or punish the criminal acts of Japanese troops.91
Contemporaneously, Western civilian leaders were prosecuted for the crimes of their
subordinates. In United States v. Friedrich Flick and others, the six German industrialists were
charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity because they were involved in
enslavement of deported citizens, concentration camp inmates, and prisoners of war.92 Rather
than finding that he actively participated in the enslavement, the tribunal found Flick guilty on
the sole basis of his “knowledge and approval” of his employee’s acts.93 Similarly, a tribunal
found industrialist leader Herman Roechling and three others guilty of “having permitted”
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prisoner mistreatment at the Roechling Iron and Steel Works when they all possessed sufficient
authority to intervene.94
As shown, the inclusive scope of “superior” is long established. It is not surprising that
the ECCC Statute uses the generic term “superior”95 when talking about the individual
responsibility of “senior leaders.”96 The juxtaposition of terms indicates acceptance that the
applicability of superior responsibility extends beyond military commanders to include political
leaders and other civilian superiors in positions of authority.97
ii.

Standard of effective control

Ultimately, the superior-subordinate relationship is predicated upon the power of the
superior to control the acts of his subordinates.98 Thus, courts may look beyond the de jure
powers wielded by the accused and consider the de facto power or influence he actually
exercises.99 This is a factual question to be determined on a case-by-case basis,100 but should be
viewed broadly in terms of a hierarchy encompassing the concept of control.101
An accused does not have a superior-subordinate relationship based solely on his place in
a hierarchy. For example, the High Command case recognized that a Chief-of-Staff normally
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occupies a high ranking position in military infrastructure, second only to the commander under
whom he serves.102 “His sphere and personal activities vary according to the nature and interests
of his commanding officer and increase in scope dependent upon the position and responsibilities
of such commander.”103 Yet this does not necessarily confer actual control over those officially
subordinate to him. The High Command case found that a Nazi Chief-of-Staff occupied a
position essentially amounting to that of a glorified secretary. To wit:
It is [the Chief-of-Staff’s] function to see that the commanding officer is
relieved of certain details and routine matters, that a policy having been
announced, the methods and procedures for carrying out such policy are
properly executed.104
Because the High Command case declared that a Nazi Chief-of-Staff had “no command authority
in the chain of command,”105 he could not be held criminally responsible on the basis of superior
responsibility.106
As the influence of the accused increases; however, the more likely he is to have a
superior-subordinate relationship. Japanese Chief-of-Staff Akira Muto crossed this threshold.
On one hand, Muto knew his army committed the “Rape of Nanking.”107 Like his Nazi
counterparts, he was found not guilty because his Chief-of-Staff position under General Matsui
gave him no power to stop the crimes.108 When he became Chief-of-Staff under General
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Yamashita, “his position was very different.”109 Even though he still had no formal powers of
command, the Tokyo Tribunal convicted him due to his de facto position to exert control over
the Japanese troops committing atrocities in the Philippines.110
An accused may also have a superior-subordinate relationship when he maintains control
of perpetrators not formally within his chain-of-command.111 To illustrate, the Hostages and
High Command cases both agree on the principle that where a commander possesses executive
power over occupied territory, he is responsible for acts committed within his area of
responsibility whether a unit is subordinated to his command or not.112 Because the occupying
commander bears executive power, he is “charged with maintaining peace and order, punishing
crime, and protecting lives and property.” 113
Surveying these and other World War II tribunals led the ICTY to conclude that the
necessary test for any superior-subordinate relationship is the “effective control” the superior
possessed, “in the sense of having the material ability to prevent and punish” the commission of
a crime.114 It is apparent that the hierarchy and chains of command necessary for the superiorsubordinate relationship need not be established in the sense of any formal organization, so long
as the fundamental requirement of an effective power to control the subordinate is satisfied.115
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C.

Mens rea requirement

Superior responsibility requires that the accused have a sufficient level of mens rea
before he can be criminally liable. This mens rea requirement is the most controversial aspect of
superior responsibility both in theory and in application.116 The criticism that superiors have
been punished in the absence of the conscious wrongdoing has caused judges, concerned about
legitimacy, to repeatedly re-examine the issue.117 What such an examination uncovers is that the
doctrine of superior responsibility has consistently required some degree of knowledge for
nearly one hundred years. While there was some confusion about the exact standard during the
World War II trials, by their end a tentative consensus had emerged.118 The consensus, which
has been slightly modified over time, was that superiors may be liable for their failure to act
against subordinate crimes whether they possessed actual knowledge or information which
should have triggered further investigation. 119 In other words, superiors could have been
criminally liable in 1975 if they “knew or should have known” from the information available to
them that their subordinates were committing crimes. This is not significantly different from the
“knew or had reason to know” standard appearing Article 29 of the ECCC Statute.120
i.

Actual knowledge

As early as 1919, the mens rea of superior responsibility has included actual knowledge.
At that time the Paris Commission recommended criminal charges could be brought against
Kaiser Wilhelm II, who “with knowledge thereof” and the power to intervene, failed to prevent
116
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or repress crimes.121 Since then, the actual knowledge aspect of superior responsibility has
remained relatively straightforward and uncontroversial.122
Actual knowledge may be established through direct or circumstantial evidence.123
Direct evidence exists where a superior personally witnesses the crime or receives reports of it
afterwards.124 Such knowledge existed in the High Command case, for example, where the
Wilhelm List recognized that a “Commissar Order” passing through his office would result in the
violation of international law.125 In the absence of direct evidence, however, knowledge may not
be presumed.126 Instead, the superior’s knowledge may be established constructively through
circumstantial evidence. 127
Circumstantial evidence may be established through a heavily fact-based examination of
the features of the subordinate crimes and the circumstances the superior found himself in.128
The factors that courts should consider include: (1) the number of illegal acts; (2) the type of
illegal acts; (3) the scope of illegal acts; (4) the time during which the illegal acts occurred; (5)
the number and type of troops involved; (6) the logistics involved, if any; (7) the geographical
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location of the acts; (8) the widespread occurrence of the acts; (9) the tactical tempo of
operations; (9) the modus operandi of similar illegal acts; (10) the officers and staff involved;
and (11) the location of the commander at the time.129
The rationale for such constructive knowledge has its basis in General Yamashita’s trial
at Manila.130 At the trial, the court noted that during a single two week period in February 1945,
8,000 citizens were killed and 7,000 were mistreated in Manila under the army and navy officer
supervision.131 While General Yamashita moved his base of operations from Manila in
December of 1944, he still communicated with his subordinates in the area.132 The pattern of
execution frequently involved herding victims into a single building pre-rigged with explosives
and a collapsible floor, all in order to conserve ammunition.133 Bodies were burned in the
buildings or thrown into the river in an orderly fashion.134 Similar patterns of war crimes
occurred throughout the Philippines in the same two week period.135 Japanese troops tortured
and mistreated 400 American POWs.136 All told, atrocities like these took place from October 9,
1944 until September 3, 1945.137 The length of time as well as the severity and widespread
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nature of atrocities begged the question of how General Yamashita and his staff could be without
knowledge.
Apparently, those involved in General Yamashita’s trial agreed. “From all the facts and
circumstances of record, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that [General Yamashita] knew
or had the means to know of the widespread commission of atrocities by members and units of
his command.”138 Regrettably for history, the Manila tribunal failed to articulate either any
findings regarding General Yamashita’s mental state in their judgment.139 The lack of mens rea
findings led some critics to conclude that General Yamashita was convicted on the basis of strict
liability, but others determine that fairest reading of the case is that the Manila tribunal found
that General Yamashita “must have known” about the crimes given the circumstances.140
Whether the latter interpretation is true or not, the Yamashita case certainly provided the
foundation for establishing that knowledge may be established through circumstantial evidence.
In the later trial of Admiral Soemu Toyoda, a U.S.-Australian tribunal articulated that knowledge
standard of superior responsibility could either be:
a. Actual, as in the case of an accused who sees their commission or who
is informed thereof shortly thereafter; or
b. Constructive. That is, the commission of such a great number of
offenses within his command that a reasonable man could come to no
other conclusion than that the accused must have known of the offenses or
of the existence of an understood and acknowledged routine for their
commission.141
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In more recent history, the Celebici case used virtually identical standards to establish
knowledge.142 The consistency of knowledge standards, both before and after 1975, shows that
this element of superior responsibility should not be an issue for the ECCC.
ii.

“Had reason to know”

The standard of “had reason to know” found in the ECCC Statute is analogous to the
“should have known” standard of the World War II cases.143 The cases following World War II
also established that, in the absence of knowledge, a superior could be liable if he should have
known of the criminal activity of his subordinates.144 Unfortunately, the scope of this mens rea
standard was not clearly elucidated by the cases, and was further complicated by the drafting of
the Additional Protocols.145 The scope of the superior’s duty to investigate, the level of
awareness necessary to trigger an investigation, and the attitude the superior must have during
the failure to investigate—these were all issues left unsettled.146 In order for courts like the
ECCC to clarify the standard, they should follow the ICTY’s analysis of the cases and Additional
Protocols. If they do, they may be able to conclude that, in 1975, the “should have known” or
“had reason to know” standard allows a superior to be criminally liable only if he had
information available to him that put him on notice of his subordinate’s crimes.147
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The “should have known” standard, like the rest of superior responsibility, was shaped as
courts defended the Yamashita case and attempted to distance themselves from taint of strict
liability.148 For example, the Hostages case found that the knowledge of the German senior
officers was less doubtful than General Yamashita’s because the officers received reports of
crimes occurring under their areas of control.149 However, the officers denied knowledge of the
content of the reports,150 and the tribunal required “proof of a causative, overt act or omission
from which a guilty intent can be inferred.”151 Therefore, as Jenny Martinez notes, the Court
“oscillated between resting its decision on disbelief of the defendants’ claims of ignorance…and
alternative theories of willful blindness or negligent failure to obtain knowledge.”152 As to the
latter, the Court decided that a commander of an occupied territory is “charged with notice of
occurrences taking place” within the area.153 The tribunal added that the commander is obligated
to require supplemental reports if the reports he has are incomplete or inadequate.154 “If he fails
to require and obtain complete information,” his “[w]ant of knowledge…is not a defense.”155
The tribunal of the High Command case also attempted to distance itself from strict
liability, but in doing so it differentiated itself than the Hostages case. It held that a superior
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cannot keep completely informed of the details of military operations of subordinates.156 If a
superior is to be convicted of his subordinate’s crimes, in the absence of knowledge, the superior
must “criminally neglect to interfere in [the crime’s] commission and that the offenses
committed must be patently criminal.” 157 Criminal neglect was defined as the “wanton,
immoral disregard of the actions of his subordinates amounting to negligence.” 158 The tribunal
then turned to the defendants, among them General von Kuechler. It found that General von
Kuechler had received and transmitted an illegal order which resulted in the summary execution
of Soviet commissars.159 The tribunal found that the order was criminal on its face and that the
crimes caused by it “should have been known” to von Kuechler from subordinate reports.160
Even though von Kuechler privately opposed the order and denied having knowledge of the
order’s execution, the tribunal stated that “it was his business to know” and subsequently
convicted him.161
The latter statement also appeared in the Pohl case. There, Karl Mummenthey, an SS
officer and the business manager of brickworks plants located inside concentration camps,
claimed that he was unaware that his plants forcefully employed and mistreated camp inmates.
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workers, received reports of 11-hour forced work days, and had visited his plant inside the
infamous Auschwitz concentration camp. 163 The tribunal stated:
Mummenthey’s assertions that he did not know what was happening in the
labor camps and enterprises under his jurisdiction does not exonerate him.
It was his duty to know.164
Mummenthey’s “naïve” defence having been rejected, the tribunal found him guilty.
Adding to the pile of mens rea standards were the tribunals of the Far East. The Tokyo
Tribunal stated that superiors could be convicted where they had knowledge of crimes or “failed
to acquire such knowledge.”165 The Tokyo Tribunal further explained that “[i]f such a person
had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, have had such knowledge, he is not excused for
inaction if his office required or permitted him to take any action to prevent such crimes.” 166
Upon this standard it judged Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who had received multiple foreign
reports of prisoner mistreatment by Japanese troops.167 The tribunal opined:
We do not injustice to SHIGEMITSU when we hold that the
circumstances, as he knew them, made him suspicious that the treatment
of the prisoners was not as it should have been. … Thereupon he took no
adequate steps to have the matter investigated, although he, as a member
of the government, bore overhead responsibility for the welfare of the
prisoners.168
Because Shigimitsu did nothing to press the matter, he was convicted.169
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The most significant, and most confusing, development in the mens rea element of
superior responsibility was the promulgation of the Additional Protocol I in the mid-seventies.170
In its first draft of 1973, the Additional Protocols included the “knew or should have known”
standard which appeared in the World War II cases above and in the 1956 U.S. Field Army
Manual.171 The draft was rejected however, because while some approved its greater deterrent
effect, several bemoaned its lack of clarity.172 After a few changes, the mens rea standard
ultimately adopted in Article 86 became “knew or had information which should have enabled
them to conclude in the circumstances at the time.”173 At least, that is the standard that appears
in English version. In the original French version, the standard is “des informations leur
permettant de conclure” which literally means “had information enabling them to conclude.”174
The commentary to Article 86 states that the difference is not significant, but that the French
version should be followed. 175 The most confusion arises from an objection suggesting that the
English version amounts to a negligence standard. 176 In response, the commentary states that for
the superior to be criminally liable, the “negligence must be so serious that it is tantamount to
malicious intent, apart from any link between the conduct in question and the damage that took
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place.” 177 This explanation is not entirely clear given the vast differences between negligence
and malicious intent.178
Although superior responsibility’s mens rea element was ill-defined in 1975, the
Celebici case provided a working interpretation that would fit well in that time period. While
interpreting the ICTY Statute’s Article 7(3) standard of “knew or had reason to know,”179
Celebici trial chamber examined the World War II cases and the Additional Protocols. 180 The
trial chamber concluded that, in the absence of actual knowledge:
[a] superior can be held criminally responsible only if some specific
information was in fact available to him which would provide notice of
offenses committed by his subordinates. This information need not be
such that it by itself was sufficient to compel the conclusion of the
existence of such crimes. It is sufficient that the superior was put on
further inquiry by the information, or, in other words, that it indicated the
need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offenses
were being committed or about to be committed by his subordinates. 181
On review, the Celebici appeals chamber explicitly connected the mens rea standards of
the ICTY Statute, the Additional Protocols and the World War II cases. It noted that that the
ICTY Statute’s Article 7(3) phrase, “had reason to know” should be understood as having the
same meaning as phrase “had information enabling them to conclude” used in Article 86(2) of
Additional Protocol I.182 The change in language was only meant to stress the objective
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interpretation the element.183 By interpreting “had reason to know” to mean that a superior has a
duty to inquire further on the basis of general information he possesses, “there is no material
difference between the standard of Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I and the standard of
‘should have known’ as upheld by certain cases decided after the Second World War.”184
The Celebici appeals chamber also explained that the information the superior possesses
may be written or oral, and it does not need to contain specific information about crimes
committed or about to be committed. 185 “For instance, a military commander who has received
information that some of the soldiers under his command have a violent or unstable character, or
have been drinking prior to being sent on a mission, may be considered as having the required
knowledge.” 186 And as the Hostages case above shows, the superior does not actually need to
acquaint himself with the information, so long as it has been provided to or is available to him.187
In short, a superior may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates if it is shown that
he “knew or had reason to know” about them. 188 The ICTY’s reasoning is fair and based in the
law as it appeared to stand in 1975. The tribunal for the ECCC may and should follow the
ICTY’s reasoning in the Celebici case to interpret its own “knew or had reason to know” Article
29.
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D.

Failure to prevent or punish

The third and least altered element of superior responsibility is the superior’s duty to
prevent or punish. If the superior knew or had reason to know that his subordinate was about to
commit or had committed a crime, he is liable if it is proven that he failed to take reasonable and
necessary measures to prevent the crime or punish the crime’s perpetrator.189 Because the
superior’s duty to prevent or punish is inextricably linked to the facts of a superior’s awareness
and effective control,190 any determination of his culpability must be made on a case-by-case
basis in light of the available record of similar judgments.191
The superior’s awareness is determinative of when his duty is triggered. The test seems
straightforward. First, the superior’s duty to punish is triggered the moment he first knew, or had
reason to know,192 that his subordinate had committed a crime in the past.193 This situation also
includes those superiors who assume command after the crime has ceased, but learn of it
thereafter.194 Second, his duty to prevent is triggered the moment he knew, or had reason to
know, that his subordinate was about to commit a crime.195 For an example of the latter, a staff
judge advocate told General Yamashita that guerilla suspects in his custody would not be given a
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trial, yet they would be punished anyway.196 Given the context, this meant that the guerilla
suspects would be summarily executed.197 General Yamashita simply nodded in apparent
approval, and the suspects were subsequently killed in violation of international law.198
A little concern may be raised by the vague temporal element of “about to commit a
crime” which appears in the ECCC Statute.199 The same language appears in the 1956 U.S Field
Army Manual200 as well as the statutes of the ICTY201 and ICTR.202 However, the prerequisite
for any superior responsibility prosecution is that an underlying crime was actually committed by
someone other than the accused. Had the accused superior fulfilled his duty to prevent the crime
at any point in time, he would not be on trial for the crime. Thus, whether the superior’s
awareness of his subordinate’s nascent crime first appeared temporally distant from or proximate
to the crime’s actual commission is virtually irrelevant if he failed to prevent it.
Once his duty is triggered, the superior’s ability to prevent or punish varies with the
degree of control he maintains over the subordinate. A superior may only be held criminally
responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his powers.203 This initially requires

196

Parks, supra at 27 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

ECCC Statute, art. 29 (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

200

U.S. Army Manual No. 27-10, supra at¶ 501 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

201

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 23, 1993, amended November 30, 2000, art
7(3) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
202

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, November 8, 1994, art. 6(3) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 8].
203

Delalic et al., Case No.IT-96-21-A ¶ 395 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

44

a test of reasonableness to determine the superior’s capacity for control, followed by a
determination of whether the superior used the fullest extent of that capacity.
Returning to earlier examples, General von Kuechler knew of the illegal Commissar
Order passing through his office from above, and he privately opposed its execution. 204 Though
he could not completely override the command because of his rank, he did nothing to voice his
opposition to his subordinates and was thereby convicted. 205 This can be compared to General
von Leeb, who voiced his opposition “in every way short of open and defiant refusal to obey it”
and was acquitted by the very same tribunal.206 In the Tokyo Tribunal, the court found that
Chief-of-Staff Hideki Tojo knew that his junior officers had ordered the “Bataan Death March,”
which resulted in the deaths of many prisoners of war. 207 Because he did nothing to bring his
junior officers to justice, even though an investigation, Tojo was convicted for failing to perform
his duty as a superior.208 After reviewing these cases, Ilias Bantekas provided that where a
superior is physically unable to prosecute, arrest, incarcerate, or in any way discipline a
subordinate, he still has an obligation to refer the case to the appropriate prosecutorial
authorities.209
In sum, “a superior should be held responsible for failing to take such measures that are
within his material possibility.”210 His formal legal competence is irrelevant.211 If the superior
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has effective control over his subordinates, if he knows or has reason to know that they will or
have committed crimes, he must use all reasonable and necessary measures within his power to
prevent the crime or punish the subordinates. If the superior fails in this duty, he can be
criminally liable. This principle of superior responsibility was sound during the 1940’s, it was
sound in the 1990’s, and it can safely be assumed to be sound in 1975.
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
A.

The problem of international armed conflict

A significant hurdle the ECCC faces is that the international customary law of 1975, as
traced above, recognized superior responsibility in the context of international armed conflicts.
If superior responsibility is limited to international armed conflicts, then many of the crimes
committed under the Khmer Rouge leadership may go unpunished. Not only did armed conflict
not begin until 1977,212 but most of the crimes were committed by Khmer against Khmer.
The application of superior responsibility to internal conflicts was uncertain in 1975.213
World War II had such a profound effect on the development of superior responsibility that it is
virtually impossible to separate the doctrine from the international conflict from whence it came.
In theory, there should be no difference between an internal conflict and an international conflict.
Several of the experts who helped develop superior responsibility, like Sun Tzu, Wei Liao-Tzu,
and General McClellan did not distinguish the two.214 Superior responsibility should apply to
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internal conflicts. Yet all of the World War II cases, considered the modern corpus of
international criminal law, dealt with defendants who had affected foreign nations.
Moreover, if the Additional Protocols are any indicator of the international customary
law of the mid-seventies, superior responsibility is limited to international armed conflicts.
Additional Protocol I includes superior responsibility, but concerns “international armed
conflicts.”215 Additional Protocol II concerns “internal armed conflicts,” but omits superior
responsibility entirely.216 Because the Additional Protocols are strong indicators of the
international customary law of 1975, the doctrine of superior responsibility appears to limit itself
to international armed conflicts. This being the case, the ECCC may find itself limiting superior
responsibility to a select few crimes.
B.

The problem of genocide

Assuming that genocide was a crime during period of April 17, 1975 through 1979,217 the
ECCC may be capable of prosecuting cases of genocide under the theory of superior
responsibility. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
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(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.218
Besides direct participation in these acts, the Genocide Convention also calls for the punishment
of individuals who are complicit in genocide.219 William Shabas opins that:
Complicity is sometimes described as secondary participation, but when
applied to genocide, there is nothing ‘secondary about it. The
‘accomplice’ is often the real villain, and the ‘principle offender’ a small
cog in the machine. Hitler did not, apparently, physically murder or
brutalize anybody; technically, he was ‘only’ an accomplice to the crime
of genocide.220
Unfortunately a prosecution on the basis of superior responsibility faces a looming
problem. The essence of the Genocide Convention appears to be logically opposite to that of
superior responsibility.221 Article II of the Genocide Convention requires proof of the highest
level of specific intent. 222 Where the superior had actual knowledge of acts of genocide but
omitted his duty to act, his omission should constitute a form of complicity.223 Presumably, his
knowing failure to prevent or punish his subordinate’s heinous conduct evidences his intent for
the conduct to continue. Trouble arises, however, because superior responsibility also allows for
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prosecutions on the low level of “had reason to know.” How a specific intent crime may be
committed by this near-negligence standard presents a paradox.224
Courts may be able to sidestep this paradox by following the example of the ICTY and
ICTR ad hoc Tribunals. The prosecutor for these ad hoc Tribunals favored indictments for
genocide committed in the form of superior responsibility,225 even though the pertinent statutes
of the ICTY226 and ICTR227 included the same “had reason to know” standard of the ECCC
Statute.228 In the Celebici case, the ICTY reinterpreted the mens rea standard of “had reason to
know” in light of customary norms, particularly those before and during the drafting of Article
86 of the Additional Protocol I.229 The Tribunal determined that “a superior can be held
criminally responsible only if some specific information was in fact available to him which
would provide notice of offenses committed by his subordinates.”230 This stricter interpretation
of “had reason to know” replaces any inference of pure negligence with a standard approaching
willful blindness.231
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The ICTR approved this reasoning, which led to three convictions for genocide under the
theory of superior responsibility.232 William Shabas points out, however, that the defendants in
these cases also ordered or participated in the genocide.233 Thus, the precedential value of these
cases is dubious at best.
As one commentator bluntly describes it, courts “are left with the task of forcing the
square peg of [superior responsibility] into the round hole of specific intent crimes.”234 Superior
responsibility borders on negligence, and it is logically impossible to commit a crime of intent
like genocide by negligence.235 Still, the logical gap and relative lack of support has not stopped
prosecutors from attempting to accelerate the morally culpable superior’s “moment of
reckoning.”236 Whether or not the prosecutors of the ECCC succeed in using superior
responsibility for the crime of genocide is something that will have to be decided by the tribunal
itself.
VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The status of superior responsibility in 1975 is both functional and problematic. Superior
responsibility certainly existed as international customary law by that time, for it appears in too
many sources both national and international for any other conclusion to be reached. The three
essential elements provided by the post-World War II cases were always within certain
functional parameters, as the period retrospective taken by the ICTY proves. So long as the
defendant is shown to (1) have had effective control over the perpetrator of a crime, (2)
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possessed knowledge or information on the crime, and (3) failed to act within his material ability
to repress the crime, ECCC can safely apply superior responsibility to the senior Khmer Rouge
leadership without concern for ex post facto and nullum crimen sine lege defenses.
Unfortunately, the international customary law of 1975 appears to confine superior responsibility
to international armed conflicts and resist its application to the crime of genocide. Thus, while
the ECCC has the doctrine of superior responsibility as a means of prosecution, the extent to
which the tribunal actually uses superior responsibility is probably limited.
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